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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
PlaintiffRespondent,
-vsDENNIS LOVELESS,

Case No. 15,511

DefendantAppellant.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
REPLY TO STATEMENT OF FACTS
The mischief in the State's initial statement of facts
is that it attempts to divert the attention of the Court
from the issue on appeal to the moral character and nature
of the crime involved.

Further, the government's recital of

the facts surrounding the submission of the verdict form to
the jury is again totally irrelevant to the basis of this
appeal.

The appellant's contention is simply that where

there are two statutes which proscribe the same conduct but
impose different penalties, the violator is entitled to be
punished in accordance with the lesser penalty.
APPELLANT DID NOT WAIVE ANY CLAIM OF ERROR BY FAILING
TO OBJECT PRIOR TO THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT.
First, the fact that the two statutes circumscribed the
same kind of conduct was brought to the Court's attention in
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earlier proceedings.

This is reflected by Mr. Howard's

comments at the time the sentence was pronounced (T. 9,
lines 8 and 9).
Second, it is the appellant's position that there is no
duty on the part of a defendant to object to a pronouncement
of judgment before it is made by the Court.

Such a pro-

cedural gesture on the part of a defendant would be presumptive, untimely and rude.

The government's argument, by it's

nature, requires and assumes that the defendant or his
counsel be clairvoyant.
Accordingly, Utah Code Annotated, 77-37-1 (1975),
establishes the presumption that the verdict and judgment
are deemed excepted to and no other action outside the
perfection of the appeal is required to preserve the issue
on appeal.

The statute states:
The verdict of the jury, and all
orders, decisions and rulings made by
the district court, or judge thereof,
including rulings on objections to, or
motions to strike out, evidence, from
the inception of the cause shall be
deemed excepted to.
Exceptions to instructions to the jury shall be taken
and preserved as in civil cases. U.C.A.
§77-37-1 (1975).

The appellant actually went beyond the requirements of the
statute and actively objected to the sentence pronounced by
the Judge (T. 9, lines 9-12).
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The State cites State v. Thacker, 98 Idaho 369, 564
P.2d 1278 (1977), for the proposition that error relating to
the sentencing process must be timely raised.

That case

does not deal with an objection to sentencing, but instead,
deals with a defendant's contention on appeal that a presentence report, which he had previously read and approved,
was inadequate.

The Court held that since the defendant's

attorney had stated that he had gone over the report and was
satisfied with it, the defendant could not argue on appeal
that it was inadequate.

The government cites no authority

to support the supposition that a timely objection to
judgment must precede the judgment itself.
clearly contra.

The law is

See State v. Mills, 96 Ariz. 377, 396 P.2d

5 (1964); State v. Cassius, 21 Ariz. App. 78, 515 P.2d 903
(1973) and State v. Vickery, 85 N.M. 389, 512 P.2d 962
(1973).

Vickery, supra, holds that where there are two

statutes providing different penalties for identical acts,
there is a constitutional question as to whether the one
providing the higher penalty offends the requirement of
equal protection and such a question can be raised for the
first time on appeal.
THE TWO STATUTES PROSCRIBE THE SAME CONDUCT AND THE
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO BE PUNISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
LESSOR PENALTY
The State's argument is concessional and impliedly
Jdmitc that if the statutes proscribe the same conduct, the
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defendant is entitled to be punished in accordance with the
lessor penalty.

The government maintains that:

The two statutes would proscribe
the same conduct if, and only if, the
victim's age is used to establish both
lack of consent and the aggravating
circumstance.
(Respondent's Brief P.6)
Even if the above point is conceded to the government,
the evidence shows that lack of consent and the aggravating
circumstance were established by the victim's age.

The

information upon which the defendant was convicted accused
him of the following specific conduct:
On or about the 6th day of February, 1977,
at Farmington, County of Davis, State of
Utah, the above defendant did have sexual
intercourse with a female, not his wife,
to wit" Brenda Winnett, under the age of
14.
(R.l).
The indictment does not allege any aggravating circumstance
other than the age of the victim.

The age of the victim was

necessarily used to establish both lack of consent and
aggravating circumstances, otherwise there would not have
been a prima facie case of Aggravated Sexual Assault.
The government cannot now claim that it could have
proved other aggravating circumstances that are totally
outside the pleadings used to indict the defendant.

The

appellant has proven that the specific conduct complained of
the defendant is proscribed by two statutes, State v. Chavez,
77 ll.r1. 79, 419 P.2d 456 (1966), and thus he is entitled to
the lessor punishment.

Ramrnell v. Smith, 560 P.2d 1108

(Utah 1977).
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CONCLUSION
The brief of the government has done nothing to change
the obvious fact that the specific conduct alleged in the
indictment which the appellant was convicted of was taken
from the rape statute and the only way that language could
be converted into a prima facie case of Aggravated Sexual
Assault would be for the alleged "age" element to be used
both to establish lack of consent and an aggravating circumstance.

The defendant's conduct is thus proscribed by

both statutes and the State apparently agrees that under
those circumstances, the appellant has a right to the
lesser punishment.
Finally, there is no basis in the law to challenge the
manner in which the appellant has preserved this issue for
appeal.
Respectfully submitted this

(,~

day of May, 1978.

~SON

HOWARD, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Appellant
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84601

MAILED a copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to
Steven C. Vanderlinden, Deputy County Attorney, Davis County
Courthouse, Farmington, Utah, 84025, this :Jt./'lfiday of May, 1978.
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